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 Cécil Fabre’s latest book is a state of the art analysis of important and emerging issues 
in the discourse about just war. On Fabre’s reading, cosmopolitanism demands that 
human beings wherever they reside have rights to whatever resources and freedoms are 
necessary to lead a fl ourishing life, and this implies “that they should be able to frame, 
revise, and pursue a conception of the good with which they identify” (3). It goes “hand 
in hand” with a certain attitude toward sovereign states and the legitimacy of national 
borders; “membership in this or that political community,” she argues, “has limited ethical 
relevance. It … does not generate obligations between fellow residents which outweigh 
obligations to distant strangers” (5). Sovereignty rights on this view are nothing other 
than “an instrumentally valuable way to discharge general, cosmopolitan obligations 
of justice.” 
 Cosmopolitan Peace follows Fabre’s much admired 2012 book  Cosmopolitan War 
and it brings the cosmopolitan outlook to bear on “war endings and justice after war.” 
She applies cosmopolitan justice to a range of normative issues that have not in the past 
been fully explored by just war theorists. An obvious virtue of the book is that it 
provides an ethical framework to underpin surrender pacts (Ch. 2), peacekeeping 
operations (Ch. 3), peace treaties (Ch. 4), restitution (Ch. 5), reparations (Ch. 6), 
punishment of war criminals (Ch. 7), and reconciliation programs (Ch. 9). Indeed, Fabre’s 
innovative explorations of transitional foreign administrations (Ch. 8) and remembrance 
(Ch. 10) are virtually new inclusions to the just war discourse. 
 A foundation of this far-reaching theory of war endings and justice after war is the 
distinction Fabre attempts to draw between “justifi ed peace” and “justifi ed peace  atc . ” 
 1  
While justifi ed peace carries cosmopolitanism’s full commitment to universal rights 
protection, the latter concept allows for a condition of peace “all things considered,” by 
 1  The subscript ‘ atc ’ (all things considered) stipulates that under a condition of justifi ed 
peace atc less than the full range of universal human rights are protected. 
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which Fabre means a “state of affairs in which individuals do not enjoy all of their 
non-basic rights” (20) because of scarce resources, uncertainty, or non-compliance 
by powerful agents (19, 313). 
 Another cornerstone of  Cosmopolitan Peace is the “dependence of  jus in bello upon 
 jus ad bellum ” (21). Soldiers fi ghting in an unjust war give up their traditional “war 
rights” including the right to kill enemy soldiers. To defend her position, she articulates 
a “causal contribution” argument, according to which choices of individuals, rather 
than citizenship and nationality, determine rights and responsibilities after (as during) 
war (6). 
 In many of these contexts, the claims and distinctions that emerge from cosmopolitan 
justice yield intuitive conclusions. Peace agreements are normally administered by the 
United Nations (UN) and a primary legal commitment of the UN is to universal human 
rights protection. Military occupation is typically a task undertaken by powerful countries 
inside weak or failed states; it is hard to envision a framework other than cosmopoli-
tanism suitable to constrain military occupiers. 
 Fabre’s framework of cosmopolitan principles represents a categorically individualistic 
view of just war. It departs considerably from Michael Walzer’s theory in  Just and Unjust 
Wars (which is unsurprising; Fabre’s contributions to just war literature frequently 
consolidate or expand views carved out or endorsed by Walzer’s cosmopolitan critics). 
So, even if  Cosmopolitan Peace refl ects the most progressive understanding of the just 
war tradition in recent memory, and one unambiguously committed to protection of 
basic human rights, just war theorists from any but the current generation would likely 
contest the architecture that makes Fabre’s framework function so well. 
 Its breadth of reach and unsurpassed clarity of argumentation nevertheless make this 
book a must read for contemporary theorists. Fabre’s analysis of two quite different 
issues—punishment and remembrance—demonstrates why. Punishment is deeply problem-
atic not only within just war discourse but in geopolitical confl icts around the world, 
where whole societies can be subjected to uncritical punishment for the crimes of a few 
irresponsible leaders, or where amnesty for war criminals can become the easy path out 
of civil strife. Fabre argues compellingly that choices of individuals—certainly the 
choices of high offi cials, but sometimes also those of rank-and-fi le soldiers—justify 
criminal punishment; punitive action that imposes burdens on entire populations 
cannot be justifi ed (179). And even when it  is possible to bring war criminals in 
front of international tribunals, doing so is justifi ed only if those measures produce 
a justifi ed peace atc (213). 
 Fabre’s pioneering chapter on remembrance argues from the same premises. 
Commemoration of past wars “is best justifi ed by appeal to the moral imperative of 
bringing about universal peace” (303). Remembrance is justifi ed when it “transcends 
national and political borders and yet is appropriately sensitive to the specifi c historical 
and personal importance which the remembered war has for those who commemorate 
it” (283). 
 Both are important developments in just war cosmopolitism and Fabre’s reasoning 
fastens together these and every other philosophical position defended in the book. On 
the other hand, traditional just war theorists might order things differently. They might 
dispute the value of the “cosmopolitan archipelago” (198) that Fabre is moved to 
defend as a model of universal jurisdiction. Regarding remembrance, they might con-
tend that common patterns of commemorating sacrifi ces by  our soldiers to preserve  our 
way of life should play a signifi cant role in justifying war remembrance. They might 
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hold in short that political communities should retain a degree of primacy in certain 
judgements about war but they ought nevertheless to cultivate fellowship whenever 
possible among their people and the rest of humankind. 
 The precedence of new just war theory over old may be this book’s greatest attribute, 
and Fabre builds a persuasive case that it is. A few will maintain against Fabre that just 
war doctrines contained much of value in phases that preceded radical individualism. 
On the other hand, few would disagree that  Cosmopolitan Peace represents the most 
infl uential and the most meticulously argued normative account of war’s aftermath 
produced to date. 
 MICHAEL  KOCSIS   Queen’s University 
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